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ADMIRALTY LAW
RECOVERY DENIED TO "NON-VESSEL" IN THIRD-PARTY ACTION OVER
AGAINST MUTUALLY CULPABLE STEVEDORE UNDER 1972 AMENDMENTS
TO LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co.
Prior to the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA),' an injured longshore-
man2 could bring an action for damages against a vessel based on
the latter's breach of its warranty of seaworthiness.3 The vessel was
' Pub. L. No. 92-576 §§ 1-22, 86 Stat. 1251 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970))
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976)). For a comprehensive analysis of the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), see A. MILLUs & J. MANES, THE
LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT AND ITS EXTENSIONS (1978).
2 Employees performing maritime tasks may be generally divided into two categories:
the crew of a vessel, known as seamen, and harbor workers, comprised of ship repairmen, ship
builders, longshoremen and others. 1A E. BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 1 (7th ed. E. Jhirad 1977).
Longshoremen are employed and supervised by stevedoring companies (stevedores) who con-
tract with shipowners to perform the duties of loading and unloading the vessel. See North-
east Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 254 n.4 (1977); Proudfoot, The "Tar
Baby": Maritime Personal-Injury Indemnity Actions, 20 STAN. L. REv. 423, 424 n.3 (1968).
Whereas seamen injured on or about the vessel have traditionally been afforded remedy
under the general maritime law theories of maintenance and cure and unseaworthiness, see
BENEDICT, supra, § 1; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY ch. VI (2d ed. 1975),
and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), longshoremen's remedies have been in a constant
state of flux and confusion. See Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act-After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 5-10 (1974). If injured aboard
a vessel, a longshoreman could recover from the vessel owner for negligence under general
maritime law, G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra, § 6-4, at 278, and prior to the original
LHWCA, Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended by 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-955
(1976), from his stevedore-employer. Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
Land-based injuries to longshoremen, on the other hand, were governed by state workmen's
compensation laws. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Responding to the
demands of longshoremen and their employers for workmen's compensation coverage for
injuries sustained on navigable waters, Congress enacted the first LHWCA. G. GILMORE &
C. BLACK, supra, § 6-48, at 417.
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 89-100 (1946). The warranty of seaworthi-
ness is an obligation under the general maritime law on the part of the vessel owner to a
seaman to maintain a reasonably safe ship. Id. at 90. Absolute and non-delegable, Mahnich
v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 102 (1944), this warranty covers not only the vessel itself,
but also its "appurtenant appliances and equipment," id., work areas, cargo and methods
of operation. Proudfoot, supra note 2, at 424. See generally Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas
Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499 (1971); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 2, §§ 6-38 to -44. If
breached, the warranty imposes absolute liability on the vessel for a seaman's resulting
injuries. Although originally said to spring from the employment contract between the vessel
and seaman, The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 171 (1903), the warranty was later deemed to be
based on the hazardous nature of the seaman's occupation. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946). As a result, the Sieracki Court extended its protection to longshore-
men because they were exposed to the same hazards. Id. at 99.
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then permitted to seek indemnity from a stevedore4 whose breach
of its warranty of workmanlike performance resulted in the vessel's
liability. 5 Under the amendments,' the remedy of unseaworthiness
was abolished,7 leaving negligence as the sole basis for a longshore-
man's recovery against a vessel.' Furthermore, the vessel's right to
recover indemnity from a stevedore was eliminated Congress, how-
ever, did not expressly address the right of a "non-vessel" to be
indemnified by a concurrently negligent stevedore in a third-party
From the outset, the employer's obligation to pay compensation under the LHWCA was
absolute and not based upon fault. 33 U.S.C. §§ 903, 904 (1976).
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). Prior to the Ryan
decision, the shipowner would be forced to assume complete liability for a longshoreman's
injuries, even if its degree of culpability was considerably less than that of the stevedore or
longshoreman. Cohen & Dougherty, The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act: An Opportunity for Equitable Uniformity in Tripartite
Industrial Accident Litigation, 19 N.Y.L.F. 587, 590-91 (1974); see notes 31-35 and accompa-
nying text infra.
I Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 18(a), 86 Stat. 1263 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976)).
Section 905(b) provides in pertinent part:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party
in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the employer shall
not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and any agree-
ments or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person was employed by
the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the
injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring
services to the vessel. . . . The liability of the vessel under this subsection shall
not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time
the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of
all other remedies against the vessel except remedies available under this chapter.
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
Congress recognized that the "substantially" increased number of third party actions
after the Sieracki and Ryan decisions had resulted in a situation in which "much of the
financial resources which could better be utilized to pay improved compensation benefits
were now being spent to defray litigation costs." H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5,
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4702 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.,
CONG. & AD. NEWS]. For a complete discussion of the congressional history behind the
amendments, see Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
See generally Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 5; Coleman & Daly, Equitable Credit: Appor-
tionment of Damages According to Fault in Tripartite Litigation Under the 1972 Amend-
ments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 35 MD. L. REv. 351
(1976); Shorter, In the Wake of the 1972 Amendments to the L. & H. W.C.A.: The Vessel's
Rights Against the Stevedore, 7 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 671 (1976); The Second Circuit Note, 1974
Term, 50 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 280 (1975); see also Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.,
417 U.S. 106, 113 n.6 (1974); Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana S.A., 553 F.2d 837,
840-41 (2d Cir. 1977); Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1975).
7 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 6, reprinted in CONG. & AD. NEws 4703.
9Id.
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action.'0 Recently, in Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co.,"I the Second Cir-
cuit held that section 905(b) does not "by its own force" cut off the
right of a negligent non-vessel to indemnification from a stevedore
who also was at fault in causing a longshoreman's injury.'2 The court
further held, however, that indemnity may only be recovered
against the stevedore if there is a direct contractual relationship
between these parties or if the non-vessel is an intended third-party
beneficiary of the vessel-stevedore contract.'3
In Zapico, a hydrocrane being driven down a ship's ramp during
loading operations failed to brake and struck two longshoremen. 4
Suit was brought against the vessel by the estate of the deceased
longshoreman and an injured co-employee. Bucyrus-Erie, the man-
ufacturer of the crane, and Atlantic Container Line, Ltd. (ACL), the
stevedore, were found equally responsible for the accident.'5 Statu-
tory compensation benefits were paid by ACL'5 and the plaintiffs
recovered tort damages from Bucyrus, who sought contribution or
indemnity in a third-party action against ACL.17 Finding that the
1o Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 716 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'g 434 F. Supp. 567
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). Neither the legislative history of the 1972 amendments nor the language of
§ 905 contain any reference to non-vessels. See 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976); H.R. REP., supra note
6, at 4-8, reprinted in CONG. & AD. NEWS 4701-05.
579 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1978).
Id. at 721-22.
" Id. at 722.
" Id. at 716. At the time of the accident, the crane was being driven by an Atlantic
Container Line, Ltd. (ACL) employee. Id.
"1 Id. at 716-17. The jury found by special verdict that both ACL's failure to provide a
competent driver and Bucyrus' negligent manufacture of the crane were proximate causes of
the accident, 434 F. Supp. at 569, but that Bucyrus was not liable under breach of implied
warranty or strict products liability theories. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Nat'l Ass'n of
Stevedores at 4, Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1978). The driver of the
crane was found to be incompetent but not negligent. 579 F.2d at 717.
" A longshoreman's acceptance of compensation benefits operates as an assignment to
his employer of the former's tort claim, unless the longshoreman commences an action within
six months from the time of the injury. 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1976). Double recovery by the
employee is prevented by the imposition of an implied employer's lien on any damages
awarded in the longshoreman's tort action. The Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943); see Fontana
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 106 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd per curiam sub noam. Fontana
v. Grace Line, Inc., 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 886 (1953); 1 M. NORMS,
THE LAW OF MARMME PERSONAL INJURIES § 100, at 181-83 (3d ed. 1975).
"1 579 F.2d at 717. Under the doctrine of contribution, where two or more persons' tor-
tious conduct concurrently cause injury to a third party, each bears liability equal to his share
of fault. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToFrrS § 51, at 310 (4th ed. 1971). Where one tortfeasor has
paid the entire judgment, he may recoup from the other tortfeasors their proportionate shares
of the judgment. Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Under the common law, contribution among joint tortfeasors was generally barred. See gen-
erally W. PROSSER, supra, § 50, at 305-06; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 131-35 (1932). The rationale for the rule against contribu-
tion was that public policy demands that the courts not "make relative value judgments of
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immunity afforded stevedores under section 905(b) only precludes
suit by a vessel,'" the district court concluded that, because Bucyrus
was a non-vessel, section 905(a) was the only possible source of
protection for the stevedore.' 9 Since section 905(a) only insulates
stevedore-employers from damages "on account of' the longshore-
man's death or injury, the court held that Bucyrus could recover
"partial indemnity" 2 either as a third-party beneficiary of ACL's
implied warranty of workmanlike performance or under a theory of
quasi-contract. 2' ACL was thereupon ordered to reimburse Bucyrus
for half of the jury award.2 1
A unanimous Second Circuit2 reversed the district court's deci-
sion.24 Judge Friendly reasoned that in light of the express language
degrees of culpability among wrongdoers." Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, i47, 282
N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972) (citation omitted). See generally Leflar, supra,
at 133-35. At least 23 states have statutes permitting contribution between joint tortfeasors.
W. PROSSER, supra, § 50, at 307-08; Leflar, supra, at 144-46.
Under the doctrine of indemnity, on the other hand, the entire loss is shifted "from one
tortfeasor who has been compelled to pay [the entire judgment] to the shoulders of another
who should bear it instead." W. PROSSER, supra, § 51, at 310. Non-contractual, or tort in-
demnity, is based "merely upon a difference between the kinds of negligence of the two
tortfeasors; as for instance, if that of the indemnitee is only 'passive,' while that of the
indemnitor is 'active."' Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 915 (1951). As between contracting parties, contractual indemnity is available either
through an express indemnity agreement, Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605, 607-08 (2d
Cir. 1946), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S.
446 (1947), or through a general contractual relationship from which an obligation to indem-
nify can be implied. See 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §§ 76.42-.43 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 2A LARSON]; Note, Contribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CAL.
L. REV. 490, 492-93 (1969). Under third party beneficiary law, an intended beneficiary, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1965), may seek indemnity from the promisor
where the latter has an express indemnity agreement with the promisee, see, e.g., Sanderlin
v. Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 385 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1967), or where the promise to
indemnify is implied, see, e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania R.R., 313 F.2d 203, 210-13 (2d Cir.
1963).
IR 579 F.2d at 717; see 434 F. Supp. at 569.
W 434 F. Supp. at 569.
21 Claims based on a theory of "partial indemnification" have been uniformly discred-
ited because they contravene the basic distinction between contribution and indemnity. See,
e.g., LoBue v. United States, 188 F.2d 800, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1951); Rock v. Reed-Prentice Div.
of Packaging Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 39, 346 N.E.2d 520, 522, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (1976).
For example, in LoBue, a vessel sought "partial indemnity" under the LHWCA from a
mutually negligent stevedore for the tort damages paid to an injured longshoreman in the
stevedore's employ. After rejecting the vessel's claim for contribution, the court stated that
"to permit a partial recovery over on an indemnity theory here would be to sanction an
evasion of the rule [against contribution] . . . by a mere change in nomenclature from
'contribution' to 'indemnity."' 188 F.2d at 803-04.
434 F. Supp. at 569-70.
579 F.2d at 717.
The panel consisted of Judges Friendly, Gurfein and Meskill.
28 579 F.2d at 726.
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of section 905(b) and the absence of references to non-vessels in the
amendments' legislative history, non-vessel actions were not con-
templated by Congress when it enacted that provision prohibiting
indemnity suits by "vessels."" Judge Friendly noted, however, that
section 905(a) of the LHWCA continues to bar actions against the
stevedore brought "on account of" the employee's injury. " Thus,
while a suit for contribution as well as one in quasi-contract2 would
2 Id. at 721-22. A "vessel" is statutorily defined as "any vessel upon which .. .any
person entitled to benefits under this chapter suffers injury or death . . . and said vessel's
owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, charter, or bareboat charterer, master, officer, or
crew member," 33 U.S.C. § 902(21) (1976), and "includes every description of watercraft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
water." 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
11 579 F.2d at 719. In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S.
282 (1952), the Supreme Court held that claims for contribution may not be made in non-
collision maritime cases. Id. at 284-85. The Court reasoned that the common-law rule against
contribution controlled and that "it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new judicial rules
of contribution and. . . the solution of this problem should await congressional action." Id.
at 285.
Several Second Circuit decisions have reached a similar conclusion on the basis of the
LHWCA's exclusive liability clause. See Lopez v. Oldendorf, 545 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 915 (1951); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950);
Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'd in part, rev d in part sub noma.
American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947). The exclusivity clause, § 905(a),
provides in part:
The liability of the employer. . . shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
of such employer to the employee .. .and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or
death, except that if an employee fails to secure payment of compensation as
required by this chapter, . . . an injured employee, or his legal representative in
case death results from the injury, may elect to claim compensation under the
chapter, or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for damages on account of
such injury or death ....
33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976) (emphasis added). The rationale for the Second Circuit's conclusion
that this section precludes contribution is as follows:
For a right of contribution to accrue between tort-feasors, they must be joint wrong.
doers in the sense that their tort or torts have imposed a common liability upon
them to the party injured. . . . Since the [employee] has no cause of action
against his employer, the [third party] can claim no contribution on the theory of
a common liability which it has been compelled to pay.
Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 1946), affrd in part, rev 'd in part sub nom.
American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947); see Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d
949, 956 (2d Cir. 1975); 2A LsoN, supra note 17, § 76.21.
" District court Judge Owen approved quasi-contractual recovery arising from a breach
of an independent duty owed by ACL to Bucyrus. 434 F. Supp. at 569. This duty was stated
to spring from the stevedore's warranty of workmanlike performance running from the vessel,
which, like a manufacturer's warranty of its product, would entitle a foreseeable third party
injured by a breach of that warranty to recover indemnity from the warrantor. Id. at 570
(citing Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960)). The district
court noted that this right to quasi-contractual recovery as between an employer and his
employee has been upheld in New York notwithstanding the state workmen's compensation
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be barred under this section, the court reaffirmed the rule that a
contract-based indemnity action is not "on account of" the injury
and therefore may be maintained against a concurrently negligent
stevedore.2s Since Bucyrus was not in the position of a third party
traditionally entitled to benefit from the stevedore's implied war-
ranty29 and there was no express indemnity agreement between ACL
and Bucyrus, the Zapico panel held that no action could be main-
tained against ACL.30
The vessel's indemnity action, first enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp.,:"
was a judicial response to the hardships encountered by shipowners
burdened with absolute liability for longshoremen's injuries under
the unseaworthiness doctrine2 and the inability to seek contribution
statute upon which the LHWCA was fashioned. 434 F. Supp. at 570 (citing Westchester
Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567
(1938)). Judge Owen further supported his finding by relying on a New York case upholding
apportionment of damages between a manufacturer and a compensation-paying employer,
both of whom had been found liable for injuries to the latter's employee. 434 F. Supp. at 570
(citing Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972)).
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's reliance on the quasi-contract theory, holding
that recovery based on that ground would essentially be non-contractual tort indemnity,
which is recovery "on account of" the employee's injury and therefore barred by § 905(a).
579 F.2d at 720. Closer examination of the district court's opinion, however, reveals that
Judge Owen based his indemnity holding on third party beneficiary and apportionment
theories, see 434 F. Supp. at 569-70, the former of which was subsequently approved by the
Second Circuit. See 579 F.2d at 722. The unfortunate use of "quasi-contract" language in
connection with warranty and equitable apportionment terminology, see 434 F. Supp. at 569-
70, obfuscated Judge Owen's rationale.
23 579 F.2d at 720 (quoting G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, at 443). The court
recognized that an argument could be made that contractual indemnity is "on account of"
the longshoreman's injury because without it there could be no indemnity, but reasoned that
the weight of precedent dispelled any effect that argument might be given. Id. at 720-21.
n Id. at 722-23. Bucyrus argued that although it was not expressly identified as an
intended beneficiary, the stevedore's implied warranty of workmanlike performance running
to the vessel should extend to a manufacturer who must "of necessity" use the stevedore's
services to load the product onto the vessel. Brief for Third Party Plaintiff-Appellee at 18,
Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1978). In response, the Zapico panel stated
that, although lack of privity does not foreclose a remedy based on a contractual indemnity
theory, a remote manufacturer is not within the "zone of responsibility" arising out of the
primary contract. 579 F.2d at 722 (quoting DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421,
425 (2d Cir. 1962)); see note 55 and accompanying text infra.
1 579 F.2d at 723. The Second Circuit also considered Bucyrus' request that its liability
be reduced on an equitable credit theory. Id. at 724. Although precluded from deciding the
issue, the court surmised that such a credit would be barred by the Supreme Court decisions
of Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952), and Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). See 579 F.2d at 724-25; notes 58-60 and accompa-
nying text infra.
31 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
'1 See S.S. Seatrain La. v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 424 F. Supp. 180, 182
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Villareal, Halcyon to Ryan to Weyerhaeuser to Cooper-Where Do We Go
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from a concurrently negligent stevedore . 33 Noting that the absolute
liability placed on the vessel often led to unjust results, the Ryan
Court held that a vessel charged with liability for a longshoreman's
injuries due to unseaworthiness was entitled to seek indemnity from
the stevedore whenever the latter's conduct had brought about the
vessel's unseaworthy condition. 4 The stevedore's liability could be
predicated upon an express contract to indemnify or upon a breach
of its implied warranty of workmanlike performance.:" Subsequent
decisions, however, did not restrict this remedy to vessels in privity
with the stevedore and charged with unseaworthiness; a breach of
the stevedore's warranty also provided grounds for parties not in
privity to seek indemnity.36 As a result, the stevedore was often
forced to bear the entire loss, 3 a result contrary to Congress' intent
in enacting the original LHWCA.3 8
Congress sought to end this circuitous litigation and the attend-
ing injustices by enacting the 1972 amendments . 39 Longshoremen
From Here, 6 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 593, 593-94 (1975); note 3 supra.
"3 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
31 350 U.S. at 125; see Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563
(1958).
350 U.S. at 128-32. The Ryan Court initially sought to determine whether an express
agreement by the stevedore to indemnify the shipowner was consistent with § 905 (now §
905(a)) of the original LHWCA, which states that compensation benefits "shall be exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee. . . and anyone otherwise
entitled to recover damages . . . on account of such injury or death." Id. at 128-29 (citing 44
Stat. 1426, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970) (amended 1972)). In deciding the issue, the Court stated
that the purpose of the exclusivity clause was to limit the employer's obligation to compensa-
tion benefits. In return, the employee and those claiming under or through him "on account
of such injury" received a quid pro quo in the form of guaranteed compensation, regardless
of fault. 350 U.S. at 129 (quoting 44 Stat. 1246, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1970) (amended 1972)). The
Court further stated that "the Act prescribes no quid pro quo for a shipowner that is com-
pelled to pay a judgment obtained against it for the full amount of a longshoreman's dam-
ages," and reasoned that the LHWCA does not eliminate a vessel's right to protect itself from
liability by contract. 350 U.S. at 129 (footnote omitted). Notwithstanding the absence of an
express agreement of indemnity, the Court held that a stevedore is obligated to reimburse a
shipowner for damages occasioned by the stevedore's failure to perform its work "properly
and safely." Id. at 132-34. Thus, an implied warranty of workmanlike performance was an
"inescapable" term of the stevedoring contract. Id. at 133-34. Referring to the Halcyon no-
contribution rule, the Court stated that the indemnity liability is not "on account of" the
longshoreman's injury but instead based upon an independent obligation in contract. Id. at
130.
Compare Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421, 423 (1960),
with Henry v. A/S Ocean, 512 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1975) (pre-1972 injury), and Williams v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 313 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1963).
1, See Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana S.A., 553 F.2d 837, 839-40 (2d Cir.
1977); Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402, 411 (E.D. La. 1974);
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 2, § 6-55.
H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 5, reprinted in CONG. & AD. NEWS 4702.
See id. at 4-8, reprinted in CONG. & AD. NEws 4701-05. "The amended Act," it has
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received increased benefits in exchange for relinquishing the remedy
of unseaworthiness against the vessel, while the vessel relinquished
its right to indemnity and the stevedore agreed to pay higher com-
pensation benefits. 0 The question not expressly addressed by Con-
gress, however, was whether stevedores were to be insulated from
indemnity actions by non-vessels." A strict construction of the sta-
tutory language and a myopic view of the legislative history justifies
the Zapico court's decision to allow non-vessel indemnity suits. In
addition to limiting itself to injuries "caused by the negligence of a
vessel" and stating that "the employer shall not indemnify the ves-
sel,"42 section 905(b) provides that "the liability of the vessel shall
not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness. 43 Since the war-
ranty of seaworthiness is peculiar to vessels utilized for the transport
of cargo and passengers by water," it would seem that in section
905(b) "vessel" can only refer to shipowners.15 Additionally, al-
though the LHWCA was amended in part to protect the stevedore
from the high cost of insurance attributable to vessel indemnifica-
tion actions,46 there is no evidence in the legislative history that the
been noted, "is a paradigm of political compromise." Munoz v. Flota Merchante Grancolom-
biana S.A., 553 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1977).
11 See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976); H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 6-7, reprinted in CONG. &
AD. NEws 4703-04.
4' The district courts which have been presented with the question of non-vessel indem-
nity rights have reached conflicting conclusions. Compare Spadola v. Viking Yacht Co., 441
F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), S.S. Seatrain La. v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 424
F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (no recovery because purpose of amendments to completely
insulate stevedore), Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. La.
1974) (express indemnity agreements between non-vessel and stevedore may be permissible
but there must be reciprocal absolute duties for implied warranty of indemnity), with Nieves
v. Douglas S.S., Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), Gould v. General Mills, Inc., 411 F.
Supp. 1181 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), Cargill v. United States, 1977 A.M.C. 50 (E.D. Va. 1976) (§
905(a) does not bar contribution or indemnity claim by non-vessel), Brkaric v. Star Iron &
Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (approving recovery under various theories), and
Crutchfield v. Atlas Offshore Boating Serv., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. La. 1975) (§ 905(b)
not applicable to non-vessels).
It was initially unclear whether a vessel held liable for negligence was likewise precluded
from seeking indemnity under § 905(b). This question has been answered in the affirmative
by the courts which have reasoned that Congress intended to prohibit all recovery actions
over by shipowners. See, e.g., Samuels v. Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d
884, 888 (5th Cir. 1978); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp.
759 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
11 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
'Id.
" See 2 M. NoRIus, THE LAW OF MARITME PERSONAL INJURIEs 59 & n.16 (3d ed. 1975).
Had Congress intended to eliminate all third party actions, the exclusivity clauses of
the amended LHWCA could have been written to reflect that intent. Moreover, § 905(a),
under which Ryan indemnity was permitted, remains unchanged.
" See H. R. RFP., supra note 6, at 5, reprinted in CoNG. & AD. NEws 4702.
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high rates were thought to be the result of indemnification actions
by non-vessels.47 Rather, testimony before the House Committee
refers only to indemnification claims by shipowners4 8 It appears
that non-vessel indemnity lacked the magnitude and the impact to
attract Congressional attention.
Nevertheless, there is ample support for the view that section
905(b) was designed to completely insulate the stevedore-employer
from liability beyond compensation payments. 9 The majority of
federal courts of appeals interpreting the 1972 amendments have
adopted this position, concluding that the stevedore's absolute
immunity was an integral element of the final compromise."' As
several district courts have noted, the Congressional policy disallow-
ing vessel indemnification applies with equal force to non-vessel
indemnity actions; money expended for litigation is more profitably
directed toward increasing employee benefits.' Hence, it can be
argued that any third party action which would re-channel these
' See note 10 supra.
' See Senate Hearings, Subcomm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
270-74 (1972), reprinted in Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 765-72
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
" See notes 50-52 and accompanying text infra. A number of district courts have rea-
soned that § 905(b) eliminated the linchpin of Ryan indemnity-the implied warranty of
workmanlike performance. See Spadola v. Viking Yacht Co., 441 F. Supp. 798. 802 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); S.S. Seatrain La. v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 424 F. Supp. 180, 183 (N.D.
Cal. 1976); Fitzgerald v. Compania Naviera La Molinera, 394 F. Supp. 402, 411 (E.D. La.
1974). These courts reason that because the warranty was created by the Ryan Court as the
reciprocal to the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness, the elimination of the longshore-
man's remedy of unseaworthiness by the 1972 amendments caused the stevedore's warranty
likewise to fail. Spadola v. Viking Yacht Co., 441 F. Supp. at 802; S.S. Seatrain La. v.
California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 424 F. Supp. at 183. It seems clear, however, that the
warranty of workmanlike performance has survived the amendments. Unlike the warranty
of seaworthiness, which has as its basis the seaman-shipowner relationship, the stevedore's
warranty is an obligation arising from the stevedore-shipowner contract and as such is inde-
pendent of the seaworthiness remedy. See Henry v. A/S Ocean, 512 F.2d 401, 406 (2d Cir.
1975); DeGioia v. United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962); accord, Sanderlin v.
Old Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 385 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1967). Hence, although the ship-
owner's indemnity action is precluded by the amendments, the warranty itself remains
intact. Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act-After the
1972 Amendments, 6 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 18 (1974); cf. United States v. San Francisco
Elevator Co., 512 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1975) (warranty of workmanlike performance by non-
stevedore LHWCA employer not affected by amendments).
-1 See, e.g., Samuels v. Empress Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884 (5th Cir.
1978); Shellman v. United States Lines, Inc., 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 936 (1976); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
51 See, e.g., Santino v. Liberian Distance Transps., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Wash.
1975); Crowshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore. 1975);
Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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funds into litigation would directly conflict with the Congressional
intent.2
Either approach, however, results in inequities. Under what
may be termed the majority view, the non-vessel is forced to assume
full responsibility for the employee's injuries irrespective of its de-
gree of fault. 3 In contrast, under the Zapico holding, where the
stevedore is concurrently negligent with the non-vessel, the steve-
dore will bear the burden of liability only when there is an express
indemnity agreement or where the stevedore's warranty is extended
to the non-vessel." Even under the Zapico court's approach, how-
ever, in the absence of an express agreement, a non-vessel's right to
recover indemnity from a stevedore is extremely limited. While ac-
knowledging various theories under which third party actions have
been permitted, the court was careful to point out that these theo-
ries generally have been invoked for the benefit of the vessel and,
in a few cases, in favor of parties found to have been in a close
working relationship with the stevedore.55 It is apparent that an
12 Congress reasoned that by increasing the benefits to be paid by the stevedore and re-
imposing liability on a third party by foreclosing the Ryan indemnity route, the amendments
would motivate the parties to increase safety measures. H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 2, 7-8,
reprinted in CONG. & AD. NEws 4699, 4704-05.
51 See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
" See notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra.
579 F.2d at 722-23. The court noted that indemnity actions have been permitted on
an intended beneficiary theory, but that in each case the beneficiary was the vessel upon
which the stevedore performed its contractual obligations to another party. See Waterman
S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421, 423-24 (1960); Crumady v. The
Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1959). Citing a Third Circuit case in which
the plaintiffs were denied recovery as intended beneficiaries because they were too removed
from the prime contract, Isbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291, I.L.A., 204 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1953);
see Hartnett v. Reiss S.S. Co., 421 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970), the
Zapico panel stated that Bucyrus' position was even more tenuous and therefore denied
recovery under this theory. 579 F.2d at 722-23.
The court also recognized that a third party may recover if it falls within the "zone of
responsibility" of the stevedore's warranty. Id. at 722. The "zone of responsibility" is a
judicially created concept which has been applied to extend Ryan indemnity to those parties
not in privity with the stevedore, but whose liability to an injured employee was in fact caused
by the stevedore's breach of his warranty of workmanlike performance. See DeGioia v. United
States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1962). Thus, where a vessel was found liable
for a longshoreman's injuries on the grounds of a breach of its seaworthiness warranty, the
Second Circuit permitted the vessel's action over for indemnity against the stevedore despite
the latter's contention that the vessel was neither in privity with it, nor an express third party
beneficiary of the prime contract. Id. Holding that the stevedore had breached its warranty
of workmanlike performance by failing to discover and cure the unseaworthy condition which
had caused the employee's injury, Judge Clark stated:
The basis of the stevedore's obligation is its implied warranty of workmanlike
service. The obligations which arise from warranty are not limited to the confines
of an action on the contract; the zone of responsibility may extend beyond those in
direct contractual relationship.
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analysis of the non-vessel's right which relies solely on these theories
will have the effect of barring most non-vessel indemnity actions."
The resulting inequity to the non-vessel is analogous to that
faced by a vessel precluded from seeking indemnity or contribution
from a concurrently negligent stevedore. As a means by which such
inequities to vessels may be circumvented, several courts have sug-
gested that the award to the injured longshoreman be reduced by
an amount proportionate to the stevedore's negligence." It is appar-
Thus while the cases speak in the language of contract, it is misleading to cling
to the literal implications of that language. The scope of the stevedore's warranty
• . . is to be measured by the relationship which brings it into being . . . [and
because the vessel has been found liable] . . . for injuries . . . [which] were the
foreseeable result of the stevedore's [breach], it may recover indemnification,
whether it was strictly a "third-party beneficiary" or not.
Id.; LaCapria v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 427 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1970). The zone has also
been extended to those third parties who were in a "close working relationship" with the
stevedore and whose liability arose as a result of the stevedore's breach. See Williams v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 313 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1963). In Williams, a stevedore's employee was
injured while unloading a barge that was under contract with the stevedore. The stevedore's
employee was assisted by a crane located on a separate vessel and operated by an employee
of the crane owner. Both workers were being directed by the stevedore's foreman. Id. at 206.
The crane owner was held liable for the longshoreman's injuries and sought indemnity from
the stevedore as a third-party beneficiary of the stevedore-barge contract. The Second Circuit
permitted the action over for indemnity on the ground that the stevedore, at the time of
contracting with the barge owner, knew that the crane owner "would be involved in a close
working relationship with [the stevedore] . . . essential to [the] performance of its basic
contractual duty," id. at 212, and was therefore liable for injuries which were the "foreseeable
result" of its breach of warranty arising from the negligence of the foreman. Id. Parties within
the zone can be said to be entitled to indemnity because, "but for" the stevedore's conduct,
their liability would not have arisen. A few courts have reasoned that liability falls on the
stevedore because he is in the best position to prevent the accident from occurring. Munoz
v. Flota Merchante Grancolombiana S.A., 553 F.2d 837, 841 (2d Cir. 1977); Sanderlin v. Old
Dominion Stevedoring Corp., 385 F.2d 79, 81-82 (4th Cir. 1967). Since Bucyrus' situation
differed from that of parties previously found to come within the zone, it was precluded from
recovering under the zone theory.
11 The Zapico court's use of pre-amendment cases is unique among those courts which
have extended the indemnity remedy to non-vessels. Other district courts have allowed recov-
ery by simply holding that § 905(b) is inapplicable to non-vessels, Nieves v. Douglas S.S.,
Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Gould v. General Mills, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1181
(W.D.N.Y. 1976); Crutchfield v. Atlas Offshore Boating Serv., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.
La. 1975), or on grounds unrelated to interpretation of that section, see Cargill v. United
States, 1977 A.M.C. 50 (E.D. Va. 1976); Brkaric v. Star Iron & Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516
(E.D.N.Y. 1976).
11 Crowshaw v. Koninklijke Nedlloyd, B.V. Rijswijk, 398 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Ore. 1975);
Frasca v. Prudential Grace Lines, Inc., 1975 A.M.C. 1130 (D. Md.),judgment rendered moot,
394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975); Shellman v. United States Lines Operators, Inc., 1975
A.M.C. 362 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936
(1976); cf. Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1977); Brkaric v. Star Iron
& Steel Co., 409 F. Supp. 516, 524-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (application of an equitable credit
might be appropriate).
The D.C. Circuit has adopted a variation of the credit scheme under which the vessel
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ent, however, that the application of this "equitable credit" 8 results
in contribution and impairment of the stevedore's lien for compen-
sation benefits,59 both of which have been proscribed by the Su-
preme Court.6" The Fourth Circuit, however, in Edmonds v. Com-
pagnie Generale Transatlantique,6' recently adopted a scheme
which attempts to circumvent these restrictions. Under the
Edmonds approach, the vessel's liability is limited to its proportion-
ate degree of fault plus an amount equal to the compensation bene-
fits paid by the stevedore, thus leaving the latter's right of recoup-
ment unimpaired.12 The Zapico court criticized this scheme because
and the mutually negligent stevedore each bear 50% of the total liability. E.g., Dawson v.
Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1972). This "Murray credit," see Murray
v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968), has been harshly criticized as being inequit-
able because the 50% reduction does not reflect the true proportionate fault of the parties.
See, e.g., Marant v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d at 146; Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko K.K.
Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Cohen & Dougherty,
supra note 6, at 605.
"s The term "equitable credit" has its origin in Frasca v. Prudential Grace Lines, Inc.,
1975 A.M.C. 1143 (D. Md. 1975), judgment rendered moot, 394 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1975),
in which a scheme suggested by jurists Cohen and Dougherty was adopted. See Cohen &
Dougherty, supra note 6.
The theory underlying the credit is that it is inequitable for a vessel to bear full liability
where both the stevedore and the vessel are mutually responsible for a longshoreman's injury.
Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 724 (2d Cir. 1978). For a discussion of various
equitable credit theories, see Cohen & Dougherty, supra note 6; Coleman, The 1972 Amend-
ments to the L.H. WC.A.: Life Expectancy of an Equitable Credit, 12 THE FoRuM 683 (1977);
Coleman & Daly, supra note 7; Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act-After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1 (1974); Robertson, Negligence
Actions by Longshoremen Against Shipowners Under the 1972 Amendments to the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 7 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 447 (1976); Stein-
berg, The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act:
Negligence Actions by Longshoremen Against Shipowners-A Proposed Solution, 37 OHIO ST.
L.J. 767 (1976).
-9 33 U.S.C. § 933 (1976).
60 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952) (contribu-
tion); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (lien impairment). See also Landon
v. Lief Hoegh and Co., 521 F.2d 756, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
In Pope & Talbot, the Court rejected a vessel's contention that its liability be reduced by
the amount of compensation benefits paid by a mutually negligent stevedore to an injured
longshoreman, holding that the stevedore's implied right to an equitable lien under § 933
could not be impaired. 346 U.S. at 412. The Court noted that "reduction of [the vessel's]
liability at the expense of [the stevedore] would be the substantial equivalent of contribu-
tion" barred by Halcyon. Id.
' 558 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1978).
62 558 F.2d at 194. The Edmonds court recognized that the scheme would not work in
the rare case in which the total amount awarded is less than the amount of the lien. Id. at
192. In this situation, however, the stevedore could recoup the balance from the vessel in an
independent action. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404,
407 (1952); see Landon v. Lief Hoegh & Co., 521 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1053 (1976). See generally The Second Circuit Note, 1974 Term, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
280 (1975).
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reduction of the vessel's liability would consequently lower the em-
ployee's recoverable tort damages .1 3 It may be argued, however, that
the employee relinquished his right to recover damages attributable
to the employer's negligence when he agreed to accept the compen-
sation benefits irrespective of fault."4 Yet even under this theory of
liability inequities to the vessel are still possible. Compensation
benefits under the amended LHWCA are substantial; 5 as a result,
the vessel may still pay more than its degree of fault warrants.
A number of the problems confronted in non-collision maritime
cases were apparently unforeseen by Congress when it enacted the
1972 amendments to the LHWCA. The courts are sharply divided
on the issue of a non-vessel's ability to sue a concurrently negligent
stevedore, and there remains an imbalance of equities in the ulti-
mate assumption of liability between the negligent parties. That
these conflicts are not easily resolved is clearly demonstrated by the
Second Circuit's reasoning in Zapico. Although the adoption of an
equitable credit scheme would appear to be the most appropriate
solution at present, it appears that legislative intervention is once
again necessary. 7
Steven M. Weinberg
u 579 F.2d at 725. The Zapico court suggested an alternative method by which the
longshoreman could recover in full from the third party who would then recover from the
negligent stevedore an amount equal to the stevedore's percentage of fault up to but not
exceeding the level of compensation benefits. Id. at 726 n.8. The court recognized, however,
that this solution is tantamount to contribution and thereby barred by Halcyon. Id.
64 Coleman & Daly, supra note 6, at 379, 381 n.123.
Under the amended LHWCA, the maximum compensation recoverable is increased
from $70.00 per week to an amount not greater than 200% of the national average weekly
wage. See 33 U.S.C. § 906(b) (1976). This maximum was established with the expectation
that approximately 90% of the employees covered by the LHWCA would now receive 2/3 of
their weekly wage. H.R. REP., supra note 6, at 3, reprinted in CONG. & AD. NEWS 4700. See
also note 6 supra.
66 The recent trend in admiralty law has been to apportion liability on the basis of
comparative fault. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975); Cooper
Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974). This form of apportionment has
also been adopted by the New York Court of Appeals for land-based injuries, notwithstanding
a workmen's compensation act containing an exclusive liability section. See Dole v. Dow
Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), discussed in The Survey,
47 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 185 (1972). See also Brkaric v. Star Iron & Steel Co., 409 F. Supp.
516 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). The Zapico court stated that the Dole rule is clearly the most equitable
form of apportioning liability between joint tortfeasors. 579 F.2d at 725.
67 The majority of courts which have considered adoption of an equitable credit have
practiced judicial restraint and called for legislative action. See Samuels v. Empresa Lineas
Maritimas Argentinas, 573 F.2d 884, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1978); Dodge v. Mitsui Shintaku Ginko
K.K. Tokyo, 528 F.2d 669, 673 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Santino v.
Liberian Distance Transps., Inc., 405 F. Supp. 34, 35 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Lucas v.
"Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974); cf. Halcyon Lines v.
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Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952) (new rules of contribution
must await congressional action). Now that certiorari has been granted in Edmonds, 47
U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1978), it is hoped that the Supreme Court takes advantage of
this opportunity to extend comparative negligence to non-collision law.
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